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Abstract
Previous research has identified maintenance information as one of the primary causal
factors of maintenance error. Incorrect maintenance information has also been cited as a
contributing factor in a number of recent aircraft mishaps. To date no one has studied the
types of errors found in aircraft maintenance manuals published by manufacturers. The
purpose of this research is to analyze Publication Change Requests (PCRs) to document
the most frequently reported types of errors found in aircraft maintenance manual, to
identify how errors vary across Air Transport Association (ATA) chapters, and identify the
corrective actions required to address the cited problem. The most common request was
for additional procedural information followed by requests to add or change the language
to improve clarity. The results show that the majority of PCRs (42%) cited procedures
found in Chapters 27 (Flight controls), 32 (Landing gear), and 71 (Powerplant).
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Classification and Analysis of Errors Reported
in Aircraft Maintenance Manuals
In 2003, Air Midwest Beechcraft 1900D with 19 passengers and 2 crew crashed
shortly after takeoff. The National Transportation Safety Board accident investigation (NTSB, 2004b) revealed that the airplane’s elevator control system was incorrectly rigged during a maintenance check restricting the airplanes elevator travel.
The report cited Air Midwest’s maintenance procedures and documentation as one
of four probable causes of the accident. Eight months later, another fatal mishap
involving a Beechcraft 1900D occurred due to an incorrectly rigged elevator trim.
The National Transportation Safety Board determined (NTSB, 2004a) that the
probable cause(s) of the accident were as follows:
The improper replacement of the forward elevator trim cable, and subsequent inadequate functional check of the maintenance performed, which
resulted in a reversal of the elevator trim system and a loss of control inflight. Factors were the flight crew’s failure to follow the checklist procedures, and the aircraft manufacturer’s erroneous depiction of the elevator
trim drum in the maintenance (p 2).
The two accidents illustrate the critical role of maintenance practices and of
the supporting maintenance documentation to flying safety. These maintenance
related accidents are not isolated events. Analyses of major commercial aircraft
accidents that occurred between 1959 and 1983 reveal that maintenance and
inspection deficiencies account for 12% to 15% of commercial mishaps and are
the fourth leading cause of accidents (Sears, 1986). Maintenance deficiencies
account for a similar proportion (e.g., 17%) of naval aviation mishaps resulting in
the loss of an aircraft or fatality (Ricci, 2003).
Causal Factors of Maintenance Error
Maintenance errors have a variety of causes and these causes can be organized into three broad categories. There are errors that 1) represent a failure to
properly execute a correct plan of action; 2) errors resulting from the execution of
an inadequate plan and 3) intentionally choosing a course of action that is a violation of formal rules and established procedures or that deviates from unofficial
norms or standard practice (Reason & Hobbs, 2003). In the first case, an error may
result from a misidentification of a signal or the failure to detect a defect during
inspection. An Aviation Maintenance Technician (AMT) may misread an instrument
or fail to detect a crack due to poor lighting or an interruption while performing a
visual inspection. In the second case, errors typically arise from the misapplication
of a useful rule or the application of a bad rule. For instance, a maintainer may
develop a rule regarding what the standard torque values or tolerances for an aircraft component may be but fail to identify exceptions to the rule thereby leading to
an error. Alternatively, a maintainer may adopt a habit that becomes part of their
routine when performing a maintenance procedure but which has unintended consequences. In the late 1970’s at one airline it became standard practice to use a
forklift to support the engine/pylon assembly on DC-10s when replacing the
assembly (NTSB, 1979). The use of the forklift in some cases caused unintended
structural damage that resulted in a subsequent engine separation on takeoff and
the loss of one aircraft, its passengers, and crew. Unlike the first two cases, a dis296 Errors in Aircraft Maintenance Manuals

tinguishing characteristic of violations is that they are often intentional, not with
the aim of bringing about bad consequences but rather to circumvent maintenance procedures. These procedures might be incorrect, lacking sufficient detail,
unduly complicated, and/or burdensome. In addition, organizational and situational factors including short staffing, lack of appropriate tools, and situational
considerations (i.e., on time departure and arrival) may predispose AMTs to
engage in such behavior.
Several recent studies have sought to identify and classify the causal factors
that contribute to maintenance error (A. Chaparro, Groff, Chaparro, & Scarlett,
2002; Hobbs & Williamson, 2003; Marx & Graeber, 1994; Patankar & Kanki, 2001;
Ricci, 2003). Lattanzio, Patankar, and Kanki (2008) analyzed reports from AMTs
submitted via the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) using MEDA (Maintenance Errors Decision Aid), a tool used to investigate and identify contributing
factors to maintenance incidents (Rankin, Allen, & Sargent, 1998). The MEDA
analysis identified 458 ASRS reports describing a procedural error that were
defined as “information not understandable,” “information incorrect,” “information
not enough,” “information not used,” and “information unavailable.” They performed a content analysis of the 458 ASRS reports to identify and characterize
the top 10% of reports that were most representative of the larger set. This analysis indicated that maintenance information (i.e., procedures in the Aviation Maintenance Manual (AMM), task cards, job cards, service bulletins, etc) was a significant causal factor of maintenance error. Table 1 shows the most commonly
reported document deficiencies cited in the reports.
Table 1
The most frequently cited maintenance deficiencies cited in maintenance
related ASRS reports.
Document Deficiencies

%

(N=46)

Missing information

48

Incorrect Information

19

Difficult to interpret

19

Conflicting information

19

The results of Lattanzio et al. (2008) are in accord with other published findings. McDonald, Corrigan, Daly, & Cromie (2000) conducted a survey on the use
of maintenance manual procedures as part of a larger study on organization
aspects of safety. Thirty-four percent of their respondents reported performing
routine maintenance tasks in ways different from those outlined in the documentation. The two most frequently cited reasons for not following the manual were
that there was an easier and there was a faster method of performing the procedure. Similarly, a survey of Australian maintenance technicians (Hobbs & Williamson, 2000) found that 47% of respondents reported having opted to perform
a maintenance procedure in a way they felt was superior to that described by the
manual.
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Maintenance technicians also cite problems with unclear or confusing procedures. Sixty percent of respondents in one survey (Hobbs & Williamson, 2000)
reported continuation of an unfamiliar task despite not being sure if they were performing it correctly and 67% reported they had been misled by maintenance documentation. Chaparro, Groff, et al. (2002) found that 18% of the respondents
reported parts being damaged, 20% reported assembling a component incorrectly,
and 25% reported having adjusted or rigged a system incorrectly because of
unclear or misleading procedures.
Maintenance Manual Regulatory Requirements
Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) Part 25.1529 (FAA 2008a) outlines the obligation of manufacturers to provide the technical instructions necessary to support
continued airworthiness of the aircraft. The manuals must include information
about all equipment installed on the aircraft, including equipment made by third
party manufacturers. Manual content requirements are also outlined for system
descriptions, maintenance and inspection procedures, required scheduled maintenance, and information about system tests and service points.
The organization of the maintenance manual is specified by the Air Transport
Association’s Information Standards for Aviation Maintenance (Air Transport Association, 2008) which defines the organizational structure of the AMM and the subject matter to be covered in each chapter. For instance, Chapters 27, 32, and 71
only contain information related to Flight Controls, Landing Gear, and Powerplants,
respectively. While the Air Transport Association (ATA) format specifies a high level
of organization of the AMM, the formatting, content and level of detail found the
chapters differs amongst the manufacturers. Although the FAA requires the manufacturers to provide maintenance manuals, precise requirements regarding the
content of the manuals are not defined. The manuals must be accepted by the FAA
as part of the aircraft’s maintenance program, but the procedural content within the
manual itself is not approved by the FAA.
According to FAA regulation FAR § 43.13 (FAA 2008b), an AMT is required to
follow procedures outlined in the aircraft maintenance manual. However, there are
occasions where situational factors may conspire against strict adherence to the
AMM. There can be considerable pressure on AMTs to minimize aircraft down time
and return it to service (Hobbs & Williamson, 2000). Under these circumstances,
mechanics may be more prone to workaround an inadequate procedure rather
than contact a manufacturer’s technical support for clarification of the maintenance
procedure. Unlike maintenance errors that results from the incorrect execution or
interpretation of a maintenance procedure the term workaround refers to situations
where a mechanic is aware of a problem with an existing maintenance procedure
and then relies on their knowledge and experience or that of their coworkers to
identify a means of accomplishing the task. Using the terminology of error analysis
the workaround is a violation because it represents a deviation from standard safe
operating practices (Reason & Hobbs, 2003) but unlike other types of violations,
they are a response to perceived problems with maintenance documentation.
Research Purpose
The majority of corrections to maintenance manuals are made after their publication (A Chaparro & Groff, 2001). Typically, errors are identified by an AMT per298 Errors in Aircraft Maintenance Manuals

forming the procedures who may either contact a manufacturer’s customer service engineer for correction/clarification or attempt to identify how to perform the
procedure. In the former case, the customer service engineer will verify the error,
identify a solution, and decide where to submit a Publication Change Request
(PCR) to the technical publications department.
PCRs represent an important source of information regarding the quantity,
frequency, and distribution of errors found in the AMM. PCRs can offer insight into
why AMTs intentionally deviate from the AMM. PCRs are also likely to be more
representative of the errors found in maintenance documentation than analyses
based on reports of incidents or accidents. The purpose of this research is to
analyze user feedback in the form of PCRs, to document the most frequently
reported types of errors found in the AMMs, to identify how errors vary across Air
Transport Association (ATA) chapters, and identify the corrective actions taken by
the OEM. These data could provide valuable information for the development of
interventions to improve maintenance documentation and related causal factors
in maintenance errors.
Method
Four aircraft manufacturers, including two general aviation business jet manufacturers and two commercial aircraft manufacturers, agreed to provide PCRs
for analysis. Manufacturers were asked to provide a chronological sample of up
to 200 PCRs. In one case, this sample represented all of the PCRs pertaining to
one aircraft model. As part of the agreement to provide PCRs, which are proprietary documents, the manufacturers were assured anonymity. As such, neither
the manufacturers nor the aircraft models are associated with the results. Analysis of this data includes the classification of the types of errors reported, the
corrective action requested, and the ATA chapter codes of the requested changes.
Only PCRs pertaining to the AMM were included in the analysis.
PCRs were classified using an error taxonomy developed previously (A.
Chaparro, Rogers, Hamblin, & Chaparro, 2004). The taxonomy classifies each
change request into one of four error types (Technical, Language, Procedural,
and Graphics) and 15 error reasons (see Table 2). The associated corrective
action made to the manual (i.e., add, delete, or change information) was also
recorded for each change request.
Table 2
Error taxonomy used for PCR analysis
Error Type

Error Reason

Technical

Language

Procedure

Graphics

Tools

Typos

Step(s)

Part diagram

Values/
Tolerances

Grammar/
Terminology

Order

Dimensions

Parts

Clarity

Alternative method

Caption/Text

Incorrect
information

Check/Test/Inspection

Effectivity

Caution/Warning
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Four researchers coded the comments contained in the PCRs using the error
taxonomy. A Cohen’s Kappa (қ) of .78 was calculated on a sample of 25 PCRs
reflecting an excellent level of consistency between the coders. Values between
.40 and .75 represent fair to good, above .75 as excellent, agreement beyond
chance (Fleiss, 1981).
Results
A total of 467 PCRs were analyzed. The PCRs contained multiple change
requests and each request for change served as a data point. The result was 879
requests for changes, a mean ratio of 1.88:1 (range 2.7 to 1.6:1) change requests
per PCR. Due to the unequal number of PCRs collected from each manufacturer,
results will be shown as a percent of total by manufacturer. One manufacturer had
sufficient requests related to aircraft effectivity, which warranted the creation of a
new category. Effectivity pertains to the applicability of a procedure to a specific
airplane. For example, a procedure may be applicable for some aircraft of a given
model but not others due to customer modifications or engineering changes implemented in later production aircraft.
Table 3
Breakdown of Error Type for each manufacturer
SOURCE

Error Type (%)
Procedural

Language

Technical

Graphic

Effectivity

Manufacturer A

44.5

26.0

14.5

15.0

0.0

Manufacturer B

34.7

28.1

17.4

7.9

12.0

Manufacturer C

42.7

41.2

14.7

1.4

0.0

Manufacturer D

48.2

24.3

19.5

8.0

0.0

M=

42.5

29.9

16.5

8.1

n/a

Table 3 shows the types of errors reported in the PCRs and table 4 shows a
summary of the corrective actions (Add, Change, and Delete) requested in the
PCRs broken down by manufacturer. Procedural and language errors were the
most frequently reported problems; in fact, for all of the manufacturers, procedural
and language requests comprise an average 73% of all PCRs (range 62.8% to
83.9%). Almost 90% of the requests involved the change or addition of information
to the AMM (see Table 4).
Table 4
Breakdown of corrective actions for each manufacturer
SOURCE
Manufacturer A

Correction (%)
Add

Change

Delete

64.6

33.0

2.4

Manufacturer B

48.8

39.3

12.0

Manufacturer C

41.7

43.1

15.2

Manufacturer D

47.8

43.8

8.4

M=

50.7

39.8

9.5
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Procedural Errors
The most frequent requests were within the Procedural category. Common
procedural errors were categorized as Step(s), Ordering, Alternate method,
Check/Test/Inspection, Caution/Warning. Step(s) refers to a request for individual
steps within a procedure to be added, changed or deleted; whereas, when a specific type of step(s) was referred to in the PCR, i.e., request for Alternate Method,
Check/Test and Caution/Warning, it was recorded. Ordering refers to requests for
a change in the sequence of steps by separating, combining, or reordering individual steps.
Table 5
Percentage of corrective actions and types of procedural error requests (PCRs)
by manufacturer.
Procedural Errors (%)
ERROR REASON
Step(s)

Order

Alternative

Check/test

Caution/Warning

Manufacturer

Corrective Action (%)
Add

Delete

Change

% of Total

A

26.0

0

3.0

29.0

B

20.7

4.2

2.8

27.7

C

18.0

9.5

2.4

29.9

D

21.7

5.3

8.8

35.8

M=

21.6

4.8

4.3

30.6

A

0

0

0

0

B

0

0

2.3

2.3

C

0

0

0.5

0.5

D

0

0

0

0

M=

0

0

0.7

0.7

A

1.0

0

0

1.0

B

1.9

0

0

1.9

C

0

0

0

0

D

0.4

0

0.9

1.3

M=

0.8

0

0.2

1.1

A

7.5

0

0.5

8.0

B
C
D

5.2
4.3
3.5

0.5
0
0.4

0.5
1.4
2.7

6.1
5.7
6.6

M=

5.1

0.2

1.3

6.6

A

5.0

0

0.5

5.5

B

1.4

0

0

1.4

C

0.5

0

0

0.5

D

2.7

0

0

2.7

M=

2.4

0

0.1

2.5
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As shown in Table 5, the most frequently reported Procedural errors were
found with the Step(s) category (m = 30.6%). The second category was Check/
Test step(s) (m = 6.6%), followed by Caution/Warning step(s) (m = 2.5%).
Language Errors
Language errors found in the PCRs included typographical errors (Typos),
grammatical errors (Grammar), a need for clarification of the information (Clarity),
and inaccurate information within a step (Incorrect).
Table 6
Percentage of corrective actions and types of Language request reasons via
PCRs from each manufacturer.
Language Errors
ERROR REASON

Typo/grammar

Clarity

Manufacturer

Add

Delete

Change

% of Total

A

0

0

0

0

B

0

0

0

0

C

0

0

0.5

0.5

D

0

0

0.9

0.9

M=

0

0

0.35

0.35

A

13.5

1.0

5.0

19.5

B

15.5

0

2.3

17.8

C

13.3

1.9

16.1

31.3

D

9.7

1.3

8.4

19.5

13.0

1.1

8.0

22.0

A

0

1.5

5.5

7.0

B

0

1.9

12.2

14.1

C

0

3.8

11.8

15.6

D

0.4

0

4.9

5.3

M=

0.1

1.8

8.6

10.5

M=

Incorrect information

Corrective Action (%)

As seen in Table 6, the most frequently reported Language error was Clarity
(m = 22%) with users most often requesting additional information (m = 13%) or
changing information (m = 8%) to improve clarity. The second most frequent Language error was Incorrect information (m = 10.5%) with users requesting either a
change (m = 8.6%) or deletion (m = 1.8%).
Analysis by ATA Chapter
The ATA chapters were also recorded during classification. Analysis shows
that the distribution, types of errors reported and requested corrections were similar across the four manufacturers. The most frequent errors reported were found
in the chapters related to Flight controls (Chapters 27), Landing gear (32), and
Powerplant (71).
302 Errors in Aircraft Maintenance Manuals

Chapter 27 (Flight Controls) was faulted most often followed by Chapter 32
(Landing Gear), both consisting primarily of Procedural and Language errors
while most of the errors in Chapter 71 (Powerplant) were Technical. Errors in
Graphics were rarely reported. In Chapters 27 and 32, corrective actions to add
information were approximately twice as frequent as requests for changes. A
small number of requests for deleting information were found in all chapters.
Discussion
We examined the PCRs provided by four aircraft manufacturers to identify
the types of errors most commonly reported in AMMs, their distribution across
ATA chapters and the types of changes required to address the comments submitted by users. Submission of PCRs was discretionary and consequently may
not provide a complete picture of the difficulties experienced by the users. Whiles
PCRs do offer insight into the types of errors found in AMMs they provide little
insight into the role of organizational culture or situational factors that contribute
to errors or the number or types of errors found in other forms of documentation
that AMTs use. The study of PCRs complements other types of investigations
thus providing a fuller picture of the underlying causes of maintenance error.
Most Commonly Reported Types of PCRs
The results of this study show that the majority of PCRs represent requests
for additional procedural information followed by requests to add or change the
language to improve clarity. These findings suggest that AMMs may not provide
sufficient detail and fail to consider the task from the perspective of the AMT. It is
common that an AMT is unable to perform a procedure as described in the manual
due to interference from aircraft structures or systems that are not acknowledged
in the procedure. Usability testing or proofing by the user population would aid in
identification of ambiguous phrasing, poor sequencing of steps, or missing procedural information. Likewise, task analyses would help ensure that procedures
exist for tasks commonly performed in the field. AMTs spend much of their time
troubleshooting discrepancies on the airplane (e.g., erroneous fuel pressure indicators or inability to control cabin temperature); however, manuals may not include
procedures for the sorts of problems that commonly occur during regular aircraft
operations (Chaparro et al., 2004).
Errors by ATA Chapter
The majority of PCRs cited procedures found in ATA Chapters 27 (Flight controls), 32 (Landing gear), and 71 (Powerplant). It is interesting to note that the
NTSB report of the Air Midwest accident cited procedures in Chapter 27. The rate
of occurrence of errors in these chapters may be due to several factors including:
1) a potential reporting bias due to the safety implications of errors in these procedures; 2) the larger number of individual procedures related to these systems
and 3) the overall complexity of these systems. As a case in point, consider
chapter 71 (Powerplant), which includes maintenance tasks pertaining to electronic sensors, hydraulic & pneumatics, environmental and fuel systems.
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Filtering of PCRs
PCRs report discrepancies in the AMM, which AMTs and customer service
engineers believe warrant revision of the manual; however, the frequency and
distribution of discrepancies found in this study likely represent a conservative
estimate. AMTs with more experience or access to experienced co-workers may
workaround known errors. Furthermore, AMTs are not equally likely to submit
PCRs. This is corroborated by the findings of Chaparro and Groff (2001) that
approximately 50% AMTs reported only occasionally, rarely or never reporting
errors in the manual. AMTs cited several reasons for not reporting errors including
the lack of feedback from manufacturers regarding submitted PCRs and their
observation that errors persisted in the manual even after submitting PCRs. Potential PCRs are further culled by customer service engineers, on-site manufacturer
representatives, and systems engineers who decide whether a PCR warrants a
change in the manual. PCRs, which identify issues that affect safety and technical
errors (e.g. incorrect part numbers, settings, clearances etc), receive the highest
priority. This emphasis may explain the paucity of PCRs citing the clarity of procedures, spelling errors or typos.
Relationship between Rule Violations, Incidents, and PCRs
The relationship between discrepancies in the AMM and maintenance error is
not a direct causal one. In most cases, the discrepancies found in the maintenance
manual prompt requests for clarification that delay completion of maintenance
tasks. Inspections of work and post maintenance functional tests reduce the likelihood of a maintenance error going undetected. Nevertheless, as recent maintenance related accidents demonstrate, the safety net can fail as the result of the
random collusion of factors including a poorly written maintenance procedure, an
inexperienced mechanic, time pressure, and failure of the supervisor to review the
work and perform functional tests. Improved AMMs would eliminate a source of
problems that contribute to errors and mishaps observed downstream.
Figure 1 illustrates the possible outcomes of the executing of a maintenance
procedure by an AMT and summarizes the types of rule-related behaviors that may
result and where PCRs and incident reports (e.g., report of incident filed in a database MEDA, HFACS-ME, ASRS) are likely to be generated. This figure was
adapted from an earlier figure by Reason and Hobbs (2003). Beginning at the top
left of the figure the AMT must first identify whether the AMM contains a maintenance procedure for the task. If a maintenance procedure exists then completion
of the task will depend on the degree to which the procedure is complete, clear,
and correct. The AMT has two choices should no maintenance procedure exist:
they may contact the manufacturers’ technical support for assistance thus generating a PCR or attempt to accomplish the task by relying on their expertise or that
of their peers. The latter choice has several possible outcomes: the task could be
performed correctly (i.e., a correct improvisation); alternatively, the task could be
performed incorrectly and is detected during functional tests (i.e., a mistake) and
an incident report is filed; or finally the task is performed incorrectly and is not
detected until a later date (i.e., latent error).

304 Errors in Aircraft Maintenance Manuals

START
NO
Was the task
covered by
procedure?

NO

AMT uses prior
knowledge &
experience

AMT requests
assistance from
technical support

PCR
generated

YES
Were the procedures
complete, clear, and
correct?

YES
Were they followed
as written?

YES
Correct task
completion

NO

AMT requests
assistance from
technical support

NO
AMT uses prior
knowledge &
experience

NO

AMT “works around”
the procedure

NO
Was the task
completed
correctly?

NO

Latent error
Mistake

YES

Correct
improvisation

Incident report
generated

YES
Was the task
completed
correctly?

NO
NO

Mistake or
Violation
Latent error

Incident report generated

Was the task
completed
correctly?

YES

NO
NO

Violation
Violation and
latent error

Violation but maintenance discrepancy is fixed

Figure 1. Schematic of aircraft maintenance task completion and possible outcomes.
As shown in Figure 1, a maintenance procedure may still fail to meet the
needs of the AMT if it is difficult to follow or cannot be executed as described. A
maintenance procedure may identify the wrong access panels or fail to take into
account physical obstructions that prevent the removal of a component. Again,
the AMT may contact technical support or attempt to identify an alternative solution. Finally, there are instances where the manual is technically correct but not
followed by the AMT resulting in a workaround. The FAA officially discourages
Workarounds as a maintenance procedure is supposed to be followed exactly as
written. This may not always be possible. Technical writers report instances where
functional tests described in the manual are technically correct but are not well
suited to the task performed by the AMT. One representative example is a case
where an AMT was replacing a part of a larger system. The functional test provided in the manual described a complex, time-consuming functional test for the
entire system as would occur during assembly of the aircraft. However, no procedure was available for functional testing after the removal and replacement of one
subcomponent as is common in the field.
Critical incident reports and PCRs serve several valuable functions. Critical
incident error-reporting systems are in place to initiate corrections to the maintenance process within a maintenance facility (i.e., repair station), whereas, the
PCR error-reporting system is in place to make corrections to the AMM. PCRs
differ from incident reporting systems in the following ways: 1) PCRs are generated at an earlier stage of task completion; 2) PCRs generated by a AMT are fil-
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tered at one or more levels within an organization before a change is made to the
AMM; 3) the information contained in a PCR is specific allowing for a more finegrained analysis of problems in the AMM; and 4) PCRs may capture deficiencies
in the AMM that may become critical incidents, as well as those that may cause
latent errors.
Human Factors and Technical Writing
The problems reported in AMMs are expected given that draft procedures are
not evaluated by users; rather, they are reviewed by other writers and engineers.
Usually, the technical writer, in consultation with an engineer, writes a draft of a
maintenance procedure using engineering drawings, system descriptions, and
operational functional tests. The procedure is then circulated amongst members of
the technical writing team and system experts for proofing (Chaparro, Rogers,
Hamblin, & Chaparro, 2004). However, the emphasis is on technical correctness
rather than usability of the procedure. This is evident in the relatively low number
of technical errors reported in PCRs. Unfortunately technical correctness does not
ensure usability. Some of the problems with maintenance procedures also derive
from the fact that they are often based on assembly instructions used on the manufacturing line and consequently do not adequately address typical problems of
maintaining an operational aircraft including troubleshooting systems to identify
defective components or replacing single components rather then entire systems.
Recent Developments
Following, the Air Midwest accident, the NTSB made two recommendations
specifically addressing human factors related issues in maintenance documentation.
Recommendation A-04-13: Require that 14 CFR Part 121 (FAA 2008c) air
carriers and aircraft manufacturers review all work card and maintenance
manual instructions of critical flight systems and ensure the accuracy and
usability of these instruction so that they are appropriate to the level of
training of the mechanics performing the work.
Recommendation A-04-16: Require that 14 CFR Part 121 air carriers implement comprehensive human factors programs to reduce the likelihood of
human error in (Federal, 2008c) aviation maintenance.
A summary of the FAA response to the NTSB recommendations can be viewed
on-line at http://www.ntsb.gov/safetyrecs/private/QueryPage.aspx. In the case of
recommendation A-04-13, the FAA responded that the term “critical flight systems”
was ambiguous and the FAA would work with the manufacturers to clarify the
meaning of the term and develop appropriate procedures. Also, that upon the resolution of another safety recommendation, the FAA would “issue a Fight Standards
Information Bulletin (FSIB) to inspectors to ensure air carrier maintenance manuals address the maintenance procedures on critical flight systems.” The FAA
responded to safety recommendation A-04-16 by stating, “Rulemaking activities
will be initiated for 14 CFR 121.375 to require that air carrier maintenance training
programs be approved by the FAA.”
The NTSB classified both responses as unacceptable noting that in the case
of A-04-13 that the “FAA’s plan to issue an FSIB does not adequately address the
306 Errors in Aircraft Maintenance Manuals

intent of this recommendation, which is to establish a program to ensure that
procedures for flight-critical systems described by airline work cards and maintenance manuals are both accurate and usable.” Likewise, the safety board
expressed some concern that the FAA did not understand the intent of safety
recommendation A-04-16. The board noted that many human factors issues in
aviation maintenance including the “availability of proper technical reference documents and guidance, availability of proper and appropriate tools and fixtures,
and procedures related to continuation of work from one shift to the next are not
related to training” and that a program limited to training would not address these
issues. The FAA has not responded to the last round of NTSB comments dated
October 12, 2005.
Summary
Analysis of PCRs revealed that the cited problems with the maintenance documentation stem largely from incomplete maintenance procedures and ambiguous phrasing and that these problems are comparable across manufacturers
and aircraft size (FAR Part 25 and 121). The problems reported in PCRs are
similar to problems cited in previous studies of critical incident reports and surveys.
Previous research has shown that use of user-centered evaluative methods
in developing aviation maintenance documentation is effective in revealing potential errors prior to publication of the maintenance manual. These methods may be
preferable to the current process that relies on other technical writers, design
engineers, and customer technical support engineers in lieu of AMTs. AMTs offer
a unique perspective including their familiarity with work place constraints and
extensive task-related knowledge that may not be represented by the other
groups referenced in the technical documentation development process. This
analysis of PCRs reveals similarities in the types of errors reported by users and
those found using evaluation techniques including cognitive walkthrough, singleuser and co-discovery user performance testing(A. Chaparro et al., 2004).
A breakdown of PCRs as a function of ATA chapters showed that procedures
in Chapters 27 (Flight controls), 32 (Landing gear), and 71 (Powerplant) were
found to have the highest percentage of PCRs. Given the additional cost of evaluating procedures, this information can be used to develop selection guidelines
as to the most critical procedures to evaluate.
Acknowledgements
This work was supported by an FAA grant to A.C. We would also like to thank
our FAA technical monitor Michael Vu for his support and assistance in completing the project.
Author note
Bonnie Lida Rogers is now employed at Cessna Aircraft and
Christopher Hamblin is employed at Honeywell Corporation.

The International Journal of Applied Aviation Studies

307

References
Air Transport Association of America, Inc. (2008). “ATA Specification 2200 (iSpec
2200): Information Standards for Aviation. Washington, D.C.
Chaparro, A., & Groff, L. S. (2001). Human Factors survey of Aviation Technical Manuals Phase 1: Manual development procedures (No. DOT/FAA/
AR-01/43). Washington, DC: Federal Aviation Administration.
Chaparro, A., Groff, L. S., Chaparro, B. S., & Scarlett, D. (2002). Survey of aviation technical manuals Phase 2 report: User evaluations of maintenance
documentation. Washington D.C.: Federal Aviation Administration.
Chaparro, A., Rogers, B. L., Hamblin, C. J., & Chaparro, B. (2004). Final report: A
comparison of two evaluative techniques for validating maintenance documentation. Washington, DC: Federal Aviation Administration.
Federal Aviation Administration (2008a). Federal aviation regulations. Title 14 of
the Code of Federal Regulations 25.1529: Instructions for continued airworthiness, Office of the Federal Register. Washington, DC.
Federal Aviation Administration (2008b). Federal aviation regulations. Title 14 of
the Code of Federal Regulations 43.13: Performance rules (general), Office of the Federal Register. Washington, DC.
Federal Aviation Administration (2008c). Federal aviation regulations. Title 14 of
the Code of Federal Regulations: 121.567: Certification and Operations:
Domestic, Flag, and Supplemental Air Carriers and Commercial Operators of Large Aircraft, Office of the Federal Register. Washington, DC.
Fleiss JL (1981). Statistical Methods for Rates and Proportions. John Wiley &
Sons, Inc., New York.
Hobbs, A., & Williamson, A. (2000). Aircraft maintenance safety survey-results:
Department of Transportation and Regional Services, Australian Safety
Bureau.
Hobbs, A., & Williamson, A. (2003). Associations between errors and contributing
factors in aircraft maintenance. Human Factors, 45(2), 186-201.
Lattanzio, D., Patankar, K., & Kanki, B. G. (2008). Procedural error in Maintenance: A review of research and methods. International Journal of Aviation
Psychology, 18(1), 17-29.
Marx, D. A., & Graeber, R. C. (1994). Human error in aircraft maintenance. Aldershot: Avebury Technical: Ashgate.
McDonald, N., Corrigan, S., Daly, C., & Cromie, S. (2000). Safety management
systems and safety culture in aircraft maintenance organisations. Safety
Science, 34, 151-176.
National Transportation Safety Board. (1979). American Airlines, Inc. DC-10-10,
N110AA. Chicago-O’Hare International Airport (Tech. Rep. NO. NTSB/
AAR-79-17). Washington, DC: Author
National Transportation Safety Board. (2004a). Brief of Accident (NYC03MA183).
Washington, DC: Author.
National Transportation Safety Board. (2004b). Loss of Pitch Control During
Takeoff, Air Midwest Flight 5481, Raytheon (Beechcraft) 1900D, N233YV,
Charlotte, North Carolina, January 8, 2003 (No. Aircraft Accident Report
NTSB/AAR-04/01). Washington, DC: Author.
Patankar, K., & Kanki, B. G. (2001). Document design strategies for improving
airline maintenance procedures. Paper presented at the 11th International
Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Columbus, OH.
Rankin, W. L., Allen, J. P. J., & Sargent, R. A. (1998). Maintenance Error Decision
Aid: Progress report, The 11th Annual FAA Conference on Aviation Maintenance and Inspection. Washington, DC.
Reason, J., & Hobbs, A. (2003). Managing Maintenance Error. Aldershot, U.K.:
Ashgate.
308 Errors in Aircraft Maintenance Manuals

Ricci, K. (2003, October 27-30). Human factors issues in maintenance publications design. Paper presented at the DOD Maintenance Symposium &
Exhibition, King of Prussia, PA.
Sears, R.L. (1986). A New Look at Accident Contributions and the Implications of
Operational Training Programs (unpublished report). Cited in Graeber,
R.C. and D.A. Marx (1993). Reducing Human Error in Aviation Maintenance Operations. Flight Safety Foundation 46th Annual International Air
Safety Seminar and International Federation of Airworthiness 23rd International Conference. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. November 8-11, 1993.

The International Journal of Applied Aviation Studies

309

